ラッセルの最初の真理論  [in Japanese] Russell's Realistic Theory of Truth  [in Japanese]

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Abstract

In his early writings The Principles of Mathematics (1903), "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions" (1904) and "The Nature of Truth" (1905), Russell held an unusual view about truth which I call "the realistic theory of truth". It is the thesis that truth is an undefinable property which some propositions possess but the others lack; if a proposition possesses the property, it is true, if not, false. Since, according to his ontology, a proposition is an entity whose existence is independent of human minds, a proposition is either true or false without human minds. My aim here is to point out the signficance of the realistic theory of truth and to defend it. First, I show that the realistic theory of truth can explain the truth of those beliefs and sentences which are normally supposed to be the primary bearers of truth. Second, I claim that the reasons by which Russell abandoned the realistic theory of truth in his later writings are merely begging the question. Finally, I argue that although the realistic theory of truth seems to contain an intrinsic difficulty, it can be dissolved by adopting some kind of deflationary view of truth.

Journal

  • Jahrbuch f(0xFAED)r Philosophie

    Jahrbuch f(0xFAED)r Philosophie (24), 64-75, 1997

    京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

Codes

  • NII Article ID (NAID)
    120000905242
  • NII NACSIS-CAT ID (NCID)
    AN00005497
  • Text Lang
    JPN
  • Article Type
    departmental bulletin paper
  • ISSN
    0914143X
  • NDL Article ID
    4282180
  • NDL Source Classification
    ZH2(哲学・宗教--哲学)
  • NDL Call No.
    Z9-810
  • Data Source
    NDL  IR 
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