Are Regional Asymmetries Detrimental to Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting?

• Itaya, Jun-ichi

• Okamura, Makoto

• Yamaguchi, Chikara

抄録

This paper reexamines the main findings of Cardarelli et al. (2002), and Contenaro and Vidal (2006), who show that regional asymmetries undermine the implicit collusion of tax coordination in a repeated game model of capital tax competition. In particular, this paper investigates how increasing regional differences in the per capita capital endowments and/or production technologies affect the willingness of each region to cooperate in achieving tax coordination. It is shown not only that there may exist cases where tax coordination is facilitated with an increase in regional asymmetries increase and the greater the degree of asymmetry in terms of the net capital exports of the regions, but also that the higher the cooperation of the regions with respect to the sustenance of tax coordination.

収録刊行物

• Discussion Paper, Series A

  Discussion Paper, Series A 183 1-14, 2007-06-18

  Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University

キーワード

• Tax competition
• Asymmetric regions
• Cooperation
• Repeated game
• Tax coordination

詳細情報

• CRID: 1050001338985947520
• NII論文ID: 120000955796
• HANDLE: 2115/22541
• 本文言語コード: en
• 資料種別: departmental bulletin paper
• データソース種別:
  • IRDB
  • CiNii Articles