Multiproduct firms and dumping Multiproduct firms and dumping

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Abstract

In this paper, we first develop a model of an international oligopolistic Cournot industry in which firms trade core goods and their incompatible accessories. We then examine some issues concerned with dumping. We find that such finns set the core goods price below cost (below-cost dumping, henceforth) even under perfect competition. We also find that firms might simultaneously engage in both price-discriminating dumping in the market for accessories and below-cost dumping in the market for core goods. Furthermore, we demonstrate that antidumping tariffs on both core goods and accessories may expand the dumping margin in the accessories market.

Journal

  • The Waseda journal of political science and economics

    The Waseda journal of political science and economics (375), 2-12, 2009-09

    早稲田大学政治経済学会

Codes

  • NII Article ID (NAID)
    120001794169
  • NII NACSIS-CAT ID (NCID)
    AN00258437
  • Text Lang
    ENG
  • Article Type
    journal article
  • Journal Type
    大学紀要
  • ISSN
    02877007
  • NDL Article ID
    10452220
  • NDL Source Classification
    ZA2(政治・法律・行政--政治学) // ZD11(経済--経済学)
  • NDL Call No.
    Z1-145
  • Data Source
    NDL  IR 
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