総合評価落札方式オークションの均衡入札--除算方式評価の場合  [in Japanese] Equilibrium bidding behavior in scoring auctions: the case of value-for-money evaluation  [in Japanese]

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Abstract

I study the equilibrium bidding behavior in procurement scoring auctions in which each bid is evaluated according to the value-for-money(quality-price ratio). In particular, I consider an auction with n bidders, each of whom receives a cost parameter for quality provision from a symmetric, independent uniform distribution, then decides whether to participate the auction by paying an entry fee, and bids a quality-price pair upon entering. The bidder with the highest value-for money experts the project with the promised quality, and receives the bidded price. I derive an equilibrium in which the probability of winning increase as the cost parameter becomes more efficient. However, this evaluation method implies a little odd bidding behavior: the equilibrium price and quality exhibit U-shape curves with respect to the cost parameter.

Journal

  • The Economic science

    The Economic science 57(4), 149-157, 2010-03

    名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科

Codes

  • NII Article ID (NAID)
    120002063162
  • NII NACSIS-CAT ID (NCID)
    AN00069864
  • Text Lang
    JPN
  • Article Type
    departmental bulletin paper
  • Journal Type
    大学紀要
  • ISSN
    00229725
  • NDL Article ID
    10643092
  • NDL Source Classification
    ZD11(経済--経済学)
  • NDL Call No.
    Z3-203
  • Data Source
    NDL  IR 
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