Equilibrium Bidding Behavior in Scoring Auctions: the Case of Value-for-Money Evaluation
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
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- 総合評価落札方式オークションの均衡入札 : 除算方式評価の場合
- ソウゴウ ヒョウカ ラクサツ ホウシキ オークション ノ キンコウ ニュウサツ ジョサン ホウシキ ヒョウカ ノ バアイ
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Abstract
I study the equilibrium bidding behavior in procurement scoring auctions in which each bid is evaluated according to the value-for-money(quality-price ratio). In particular, I consider an auction with n bidders, each of whom receives a cost parameter for quality provision from a symmetric, independent uniform distribution, then decides whether to participate the auction by paying an entry fee, and bids a quality-price pair upon entering. The bidder with the highest value-for money experts the project with the promised quality, and receives the bidded price. I derive an equilibrium in which the probability of winning increase as the cost parameter becomes more efficient. However, this evaluation method implies a little odd bidding behavior: the equilibrium price and quality exhibit U-shape curves with respect to the cost parameter.
Journal
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- 経済科学
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経済科学 57 (4), 149-157, 2010-03-25
名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390572174582927104
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- NII Article ID
- 120002063162
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- NII Book ID
- AN00069864
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- HANDLE
- 2237/13171
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- NDL BIB ID
- 10643092
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- ISSN
- 00229725
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- Text Lang
- ja
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
- IRDB
- NDL
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN
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- Abstract License Flag
- Allowed