総合評価落札方式オークションの均衡入札--除算方式評価の場合 Equilibrium bidding behavior in scoring auctions: the case of value-for-money evaluation

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抄録

I study the equilibrium bidding behavior in procurement scoring auctions in which each bid is evaluated according to the value-for-money(quality-price ratio). In particular, I consider an auction with n bidders, each of whom receives a cost parameter for quality provision from a symmetric, independent uniform distribution, then decides whether to participate the auction by paying an entry fee, and bids a quality-price pair upon entering. The bidder with the highest value-for money experts the project with the promised quality, and receives the bidded price. I derive an equilibrium in which the probability of winning increase as the cost parameter becomes more efficient. However, this evaluation method implies a little odd bidding behavior: the equilibrium price and quality exhibit U-shape curves with respect to the cost parameter.

収録刊行物

  • 経済科学

    経済科学 57(4), 149-157, 2010-03

    名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科

各種コード

  • NII論文ID(NAID)
    120002063162
  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    AN00069864
  • 本文言語コード
    JPN
  • 資料種別
    departmental bulletin paper
  • 雑誌種別
    大学紀要
  • ISSN
    00229725
  • NDL 記事登録ID
    10643092
  • NDL 雑誌分類
    ZD11(経済--経済学)
  • NDL 請求記号
    Z3-203
  • データ提供元
    NDL  IR 
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