総合評価落札方式オークションの均衡入札--除算方式評価の場合 Equilibrium bidding behavior in scoring auctions: the case of value-for-money evaluation
I study the equilibrium bidding behavior in procurement scoring auctions in which each bid is evaluated according to the value-for-money(quality-price ratio). In particular, I consider an auction with n bidders, each of whom receives a cost parameter for quality provision from a symmetric, independent uniform distribution, then decides whether to participate the auction by paying an entry fee, and bids a quality-price pair upon entering. The bidder with the highest value-for money experts the project with the promised quality, and receives the bidded price. I derive an equilibrium in which the probability of winning increase as the cost parameter becomes more efficient. However, this evaluation method implies a little odd bidding behavior: the equilibrium price and quality exhibit U-shape curves with respect to the cost parameter.
経済科学 57(4), 149-157, 2010-03