Contribution Cycles and Preferable Incentive Schemes

DOI 機関リポジトリ Web Site

この論文をさがす

抄録

This note considers a situation in which the publisher of an academic journal seeks to maintain the number of contributions to the journal by subsidizing the contributors with some incentive payments. We show that under the incentive payment scheme that distributes some pre−determined total amount of payments equally to each contributor (the constant total payment scheme), the number of contributions can fluctuate cyclically as well as chaotically over time when the potential contributors form adaptive expectations. Numerical simulations suggest, among other things, that the performance of the constant total payment scheme may be more efficient than the constant per−capita payment scheme when the total amount of payments is supposed to be small.

収録刊行物

詳細情報 詳細情報について

問題の指摘

ページトップへ