R&D, Privatization, Public Monopoly, Mixed Oligopoly, and Productive Efficiency

Access this Article

Search this Article

Abstract

We investigate R&D behavior of public firms by using oligopoly models with Cournot−type−quantity and Bertrand−type−price competition. Then the following results are obtained. When public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly market are involved in quantity competition, (i) the public firm has a greater incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in a public monopoly market than in that market if they are substitutes, and (ii) the public firm has a less incentive to invest in R&D in the oligopoly market if they are complements. Furthermore, suppose that public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly market are involved in price competition. (i) If the products are complements, then a public firm has a greater incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in the public monopoly market than in the mixed oligopoly market; and (ii) if they are substitutes, then the public firm has a less incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in the public monopoly market than in the mixed oligopolymarket.

Journal

  • Okayama economics review

    Okayama economics review 36(4), 377-389, 2005-03

    岡山大学経済学会

Codes

  • NII Article ID (NAID)
    120002576156
  • NII NACSIS-CAT ID (NCID)
    AN00032897
  • Text Lang
    ENG
  • Article Type
    journal article
  • Journal Type
    大学紀要
  • ISSN
    03863069
  • NDL Article ID
    7275874
  • NDL Source Classification
    ZD11(経済--経済学)
  • NDL Call No.
    Z3-940
  • Data Source
    NDL  IR 
Page Top