R&D, Privatization, Public Monopoly, Mixed Oligopoly, and Productive Efficiency
この論文をさがす
抄録
We investigate R&D behavior of public firms by using oligopoly models with Cournot−type−quantity and Bertrand−type−price competition. Then the following results are obtained. When public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly market are involved in quantity competition, (i) the public firm has a greater incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in a public monopoly market than in that market if they are substitutes, and (ii) the public firm has a less incentive to invest in R&D in the oligopoly market if they are complements. Furthermore, suppose that public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly market are involved in price competition. (i) If the products are complements, then a public firm has a greater incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in the public monopoly market than in the mixed oligopoly market; and (ii) if they are substitutes, then the public firm has a less incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in the public monopoly market than in the mixed oligopoly market.
収録刊行物
-
- 岡山大学経済学会雑誌
-
岡山大学経済学会雑誌 36 (4), 15-27, 2005-03-10
岡山大学経済学会
- Tweet
詳細情報 詳細情報について
-
- CRID
- 1390853649554759808
-
- NII論文ID
- 120002576156
-
- NII書誌ID
- AN00032897
-
- ISSN
- 03863069
-
- NDL書誌ID
- 7275874
-
- 本文言語コード
- en
-
- データソース種別
-
- JaLC
- IRDB
- NDL
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN