Disclosure Policy, and Competition and Cartelization in R&D: Cournot and Bertrand Competition

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Abstract

This paper considers whether firms have incentives to disclose their R&D information to their rivals in Cournot−quantity setting and Bertrand−price setting models. Furthermore, we compare market performances, e.g. R&D investments, prices and profits, in these models. It is shown that whether they have such incentivesdepends only on the signs of cross−price effects in demand functions, irrespective of the type of competition, e.g. Cournot or Bertrand competition. When making comparisons of them among four modes, we find that the formation of R&D cartels tends to increase the expenditure of R&D investment and then gains more profits.Alternatively, we point out that quantity−setting firms gain more profits in the presence of R&D cooperation than in the absence of it when products are substitutes in terms of Cournot competition.

Journal

  • Okayama economics review

    Okayama economics review 35(4), 331-335, 2004-03

    岡山大学経済学会

Codes

  • NII Article ID (NAID)
    120002647268
  • NII NACSIS-CAT ID (NCID)
    AN00032897
  • Text Lang
    ENG
  • Article Type
    journal article
  • Journal Type
    大学紀要
  • ISSN
    03863069
  • NDL Article ID
    6882194
  • NDL Source Classification
    ZD11(経済--経済学)
  • NDL Call No.
    Z3-940
  • Data Source
    NDL  IR 
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