品質の選択,垂直的製品差別化と労働者管理寡占 Quality choice, vertical product differentiation, and labor-managed oligopoly

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抄録

Although quality choice of profit-maximizing oligopolistic firms has been widely analyzed, it is rare to find such an analysis of labor-managed oligopolistic firms. This paper considers the relationship between vertical product differentiation and labor-managed firms in either partial or full market coverage by using a two-stage game model. At the second stage they are involved in either Bertrand or Cournot competition. Then some results, which are different from those derived from the conventional firms, are obtained. For example, 1) whenlabor-managed firms are involved in price competition in an output market, there exists an interior solution only in an extremely limited case; 2) fixed costs affect not only price and output levels but also the level ofquality under both price and quantity competition; and 3) it is impossible to analyze under full market coverage, irrespective of whether labor-managed firms are involved in price or quantity competition in an output market.

収録刊行物

  • 岡山大学経済学会雑誌

    岡山大学経済学会雑誌 42(4), 203-217, 2011-03

    岡山大学経済学会

各種コード

  • NII論文ID(NAID)
    120002835624
  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    AN00032897
  • 本文言語コード
    JPN
  • 資料種別
    journal article
  • 雑誌種別
    大学紀要
  • ISSN
    03863069
  • NDL 記事登録ID
    11061153
  • NDL 雑誌分類
    ZD11(経済--経済学)
  • NDL 請求記号
    Z3-940
  • データ提供元
    NDL  IR 
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