Global dynamics in repeated games with additively separable payoffs

• KAMIHIGASHI, Takashi

  Kobe University

• 古沢, 泰治

  Hitotsubashi University

抄録

This paper studies the global dynamics of a class of infinitely repeated two-player games in which the action space of each player is an interval, and the one-shot payoff of each player is additively separable in actions. We define an immediately reactive equilibrium (IRE) as a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium such that each player's action is a stationary function of the opponent's last action. We completely characterize IREs and their dynamics in terms of certain indifference curves. Our results are used to show that in a prisoners' dilemma game with mixed strategies, gradual cooperation occurs when the players are sufficiently patient, and that in a certain duopoly game, kinked demand curves emerge naturally.

収録刊行物

• Review of Economic Dynamics

  Review of Economic Dynamics 13 (4), 899-918, 2010-10

  Elsevier

キーワード

• Immediately reactive equilibria
• Additively separable payoffs
• Kinked demand
• Gradual cooperation
• Prisoners' dilemma

詳細情報

• CRID: 1050569015577594880
• NII論文ID: 120003802950
• NII書誌ID: AA1123800X
• ISSN: 10942025
• HANDLE: 10086/22159
• 本文言語コード: en
• 資料種別: journal article
• データソース種別:
  • IRDB
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN