Secure Implementation -Theory and Experiments-

• Saijo Tatsuyoshi

• Yamato Takehiko

Bibliographic Information

Other Title

• セキュア遂行―理論と実験―
• セキュア スイコウ リロン ト ジッケン

Abstract

Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling be a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. However, we argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible solution to this problem is to require double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and in Nash equilibria, called secure implementation. We conducted experiments on two strategy-proof mechanisms. One of them is not secure with many bad Nash equilibria, whereas the other secure mechanism has a unique good Nash equilibrium. We observed subjects adopted dominant strategies significantly less often in the non-secure mechanism than in the secure mechanism.

Journal

• 経済研究

  経済研究 58 (2), 122-135, 2007-04-25

  岩波書店

Details

• CRID: 1390853649798294528
• NII Article ID: 120005252786
• NII Book ID: AN00070761
• DOI: 10.15057/21352
• HANDLE: 10086/19792
• NDL BIB ID: 8810025
• ISSN: 00229733
• Web Site: https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp/books/R000000004-I8810025
• Text Lang: ja
• Data Source:
  • JaLC
  • IRDB
  • NDL
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN
• Abstract License Flag: Disallowed