Strategic Delegation in Asymmetric Tax Competition

• Ogawa, Hikaru

• Susa, Taiki

抄録

This study examines asymmetric tax competition under representative democracy systems. The findings show that the degree of asymmetry between countries affects the result of elections in each country, where the citizens select a policymaker to set a tax rate for the country. In particular, under certain conditions, a decisive voter in the election can select a citizen whose share of the country’s capital is higher than the decisive voter’s own share.

収録刊行物

• Economic Research Center Discussion Paper

  Economic Research Center Discussion Paper (E14-3), 2014-02

  名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科附属国際経済政策研究センター

キーワード

• Tax competition
• Strategic delegation
• Terms of trade

詳細情報

• CRID: 1050001338802496896
• NII論文ID: 120005385270
• HANDLE: 2237/19504
• Web Site: https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/17421
• 本文言語コード: en
• 資料種別: departmental bulletin paper
• データソース種別:
  • IRDB
  • CiNii Articles