ライプニッツの創造論 (二)

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タイトル別名
  • Leibniz on the Creation of the World (2)
  • ライプニッツの創造論(2)
  • ライプニッツ ノ ソウゾウロン(2)

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抄録

After recapitulating the results of the Part 1, the author continues to expound his views on the Creation in Leibniz's philosophy. According to the author, the Creation means the loss of the univocity that prevails in the possible world(s). Conversely, the created world is characterized by its perspectival plurivocity. This is decidedly important to understand God's relation to the created world of the Monads. God can know the possible world(s) in a transparent way as "series". But the created world makes differences on this point. It cannot be comprehended as it is nor "calculated" even by God, because of its having a peculiar mode of being : it has its own "privacy" or "interiority". So the real, created world contains something that is not to be found in the possible world(s) and it is permitted to be free in its own way. God accepts this in his will to create the world. These differences correspond to two aspects jointly constituting the one, single Divine Will of the Creation. The one is called "voluntas antecedens", the other "voluntas consequens" by Leibniz ("Causa Dei" §24-27). Leibniz explicitly uses this scholastic terminology in a new key to explain what the Creation really means in his Theodicy. God determines the world by voluntas antecedens severally but he affirms it by voluntas consequens holistically. It can be said that the former, choosing or determining will is ontological in so far as it concerns the individuals as "complete concepts", while the latter is henological, because the affirmation is equivalent to the return of the created Many as a whole to the creator as the One (the Monadology, §90). Thus Leibniz shows his originality in the long history of creation vs. henology controversy by his concept of the creation as bringing forth of the henological relation between God and the world. The author concludes the article by asserting that although it is true that Leibnizian theodicy as the justification of God for and by us is indeed our questioning of God, but in a more profound way it is also a self-questioning of God for and by Himself.

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