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Abstract
We show that a strong moral right in Japanese Copyright Law causes a hold up problem when derivative work is created because of the possibility of the ex-post renegotiation with 100% bargaining power residing with the copyright holder of original work has. By expanding on the Hart and Moore [1999] Model, we show that even if complete plan of the license agreement of the copyright can be written ex-ante, It can not prevent the hold up problem because of the ex-post renegotiation that is caused by moral rights for Integrity. And we also show that stronger moral rights bring more severe hold up problem.
Journal
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- 経済系 : 関東学院大学経済学会研究論集
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経済系 : 関東学院大学経済学会研究論集 238 139-148, 2009-01
関東学院大学経済研究所
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1050845762740477952
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- NII Article ID
- 120006024975
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- NII Book ID
- AN00302437
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- ISSN
- 02870924
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- NDL BIB ID
- 10165549
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- Text Lang
- en
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- Article Type
- departmental bulletin paper
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- Data Source
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- IRDB
- NDL
- CiNii Articles