Classical Empiricism and Naturalism

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Other Title
  • 古典的経験論と自然主義
  • コテンテキ ケイケンロン ト シゼン シュギ

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Abstract

In his "Five Milestones of Empiricism, " W. V. Quine explained that his empiricism was a sort of naturalistic one that was established through five steps from original, classical empiricism. However, classical empiricism itself was originally "naturalistic" in Quine's sense of the term. Strictly, any philosophical standpoint must have a naturalistic character so long as it adopts the "theory of ideas" based on the "idea idea" that Descartes introduced. In this sense Descartes' position, too, is implicitly naturalistic, though it has an explicit, foundationalistic tendency. In this article I first clarify what framework Locke's theory of ideas possessed, thereby making it clear that it was originally naturalistic. The framework is three-term-relational, comprising hypothetically posited "Things themselves, " "Ideas" in the mind, and the "Mind" that perceives the ideas. Then I argue that Berkeley and Hume distorted the Lockian naturalistic, three-term-relational framework in their respective ways. For example, though he erases the first term, "Things themselves, " Berkeley still maintains the "idea" idea. Seeing that "Idea" was introduced by positing the new "Things themselves" hypothetically, Berkeley's notion of "ideas" without "Things themselves" is logically problematic. Lastly, I assert that Kant's basic position was based on a Lockian naturalistic framework and that the framework of his transcendental idealism was established by distorting Lockian logical space in a certain different way. Kant, of course, is not an empiricist, but to grasp the character of classical empiricism it is indispensable to recognize the fact that his transcendental idealism is based on Locke's naturalistic theory of ideas. Richard Rorty once criticized Locke's and Quine's naturalistic epistemologies for devoting their energies to a useless purpose. If we recognize, however, the naturalistic character that classical empiricism originally possessed, then we may be able to develop a view different from Rorty's.

Journal

  • 人間存在論

    人間存在論 21 75-85, 2015-07-01

    京都大学大学院人間・環境学研究科『人間存在論』刊行会

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