Running Multiple Candidates, Dividing the Vote Under the Single Nontransferable Vote System: Evidence From Japan's Upper House Elections

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Abstract

Political parties seek to make optimal nominations of candidates to maximize the number of seats they may win. In a multi-member district with a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system, parties need to run the optimal number of candidates in each electoral district. If too many or too few candidates are run, they may lose seats they might otherwise have won. In this situation, district-level party organizations face a collective action problem: they do not have the incentive to run multiple candidates for fear of losing all seats, despite needing to do so in order for the party to win a majority of seats in a legislature. This study examines the factors that enable parties to run multiple candidates in SNTV districts, and shows that parties undertake this action when they are able to divide the vote between party candidates on the basis of geography in the case of Japan.

Journal

  • Asian Politics & Policy

    Asian Politics & Policy 9(3), 402-426, 2017-07

    Wiley

Codes

  • NII Article ID (NAID)
    120006454574
  • NII NACSIS-CAT ID (NCID)
    AA12408706
  • Text Lang
    ENG
  • Article Type
    journal article
  • ISSN
    1943-0779
  • Data Source
    IR 
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