Tourism tax, tourism boom and privatization in a mixed oligopoly (藤岡明房教授定年退任記念号)
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This paper investigates the welfare effect of a tourism boom and a tourismtax in the context of imperfect competition. In particular, we characterizethe welfare effects of a tourism boom and the optimal tourism taxrate, in the case of a standard Cournot oligopoly and the case of a mixedoligopoly in which a public firm and private firms compete. While the optimaltourism tax rate for the host country is given by a specific level inthe case of private oligopoly, it is given by an arbitrary level that satisfiesthe profit maximization condition for private firms in the case of mixedoligopoly. In the case of private oligopoly, the welfare effect of a tourismboom is positive as long as the tourism tax is given by a non-negativelevel, but in the case of mixed oligopoly, the effect can be negative whenthe tourism tax is set at a low level and the private (public) firm's share ofoutput is sufficiently small (large) relative to the entire market.
- 経済学季報 = The Quarterly journal of Rissho Economics Society
経済学季報 = The Quarterly journal of Rissho Economics Society 68(4), 65-82, 2019-03