Corruption in Auctions of Land-Use Rights : Empirical Assessment of Seven Chinese Cities

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Abstract

The state owns all urban land in China. Local governments sell land-use rights via regular English auctions ( paimai), nominated auctions (zhaobiao) and "two-stage auctions" ( guapai). The sale of these rights generates sizable revenues for local governments, and Cai, Henderson, and Zhang (2013) argue that two-stage auctions are more vulnerable to "positive selection"-i. e., corrupt officials divert attractive properties to two-stage auctions. They find that the prices of use rights sold in two-stage auctions are lower, primarily because two-stage auctions typically have only one bidder. Building upon their evidence with data from six Chinese cities, this study estimates a reduced form model of price differentials between the two types of auctions and discusses how the type of auction influences the prices of land-use rights.

Journal

  • 国民経済雑誌 = Journal of economics & business administration

    国民経済雑誌 = Journal of economics & business administration 218(3), 49-59, 2018-09

    神戸大学経済経営学会

Codes

  • NII Article ID (NAID)
    120006728088
  • NII NACSIS-CAT ID (NCID)
    AN00090962
  • Text Lang
    ENG
  • Article Type
    departmental bulletin paper
  • Journal Type
    大学紀要
  • ISSN
    0387-3129
  • NDL Article ID
    029274056
  • NDL Call No.
    Z3-260
  • Data Source
    NDL  IR 
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