Split-Ticket Voting under the Bicameral System : How Did Japanese Voters Allocate Their Four Tickets?

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Considering features of the Japanese bicameral legislature and the electoral systems, this study argues that Japanese voters strategically place the four total votes to which they are entitled, two for the Lower House and two for the Upper House election. The view is that Japanese voters are ''balancing votes" by voting for different parties in various elections in an attempt to balance the power between the Lower House and Upper House or between ruling and opposition parties. That is, assume that a group of voters are split-ticket voting within one election when voting for the Lower or Upper House, while other groups are split-ticket voting between elections. The analysis shows that the Japanese split-ticket voting is essentially "forced" onto the voters; however, the voting is also a result of the voters' decision to balance their votes, in that voters use their four votes according to circumstances. On the basis of this result, split-ticket voting in the bicameral system must take into account the split-ticket voting between elections as well as the split-ticket voting within one election.

This work was supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B, No. 21330031), from Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS).

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