Coalitional equilibria in non-cooperative games with strategic substitutes : Self-enforcing coalition deviations and irreversibility

• Shinohara Ryusuke

Abstract

type:Article

Introducing a coalitional equilibrium with restricted deviations, we examine how effectively equilibria based on coalitional stability refine Nash equilibria in games with σ-strategic substitutes and σ-monotone externalities. From the existing equilibria such as coalition-proof Nash equilibria and near-strong Nash equilibria, we can consider several ways to restrict coalitional deviations. We incorporate two natural self-enforcing conditions of coalition deviations, Nash stability and irreversibility, into the coalitional equilibrium and provide a more general analysis than earlier studies. We find it impossible that in each of the two stability concepts, the coalitional equilibrium effectively refines the Nash equilibrium for all games with σ-strategic substitutes and σ-monotone externalities.

Journal

• Journal of International Economic Studies

  Journal of International Economic Studies 34 11-22, 2020-03

  The Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University

Keywords

• Coalitional equilibrium with restricted deviations
• Nash stability
• Irreversibility

Details

• CRID: 1390572174784760704
• NII Article ID: 120006890482
• NII Book ID: AA10459262
• ISSN: 09111247
• DOI: 10.15002/00023140
• Web Site: http://hdl.handle.net/10114/00023140
• Text Lang: en
• Data Source:
  • JaLC
  • IRDB
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN