Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts

• Kasuya, Yusuke

Abstract

In the matching with contracts framework, under the assumption that each hospital has a choice function that satisfies the observable substitutability condition, we show that the strategy-proof cumulative offer mechanism is no longer guaranteed to be group strategy-proof, yet it nevertheless outputs a weakly Pareto efficient outcome for any input. We also discuss why, unlike the previous observations in the literature, the equivalence of strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness does not carry over to our context.

Journal

• Economics Letters

  Economics Letters 202 109824-, 2021-05

  Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

• Matching with contracts
• Observable substitutability
• Strategy-proofness
• Group strategy-proofness
• Pareto efficiency

Details

• CRID: 1050013861703871360
• NII Article ID: 120007041609
• NII Book ID: AA00174222
• DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109824
• HANDLE: 20.500.14094/90008324
• ISSN: 01651765
• Web Site: https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0165176521001014?httpAccept=text/xml
• Web Site: https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0165176521001014?httpAccept=text/plain
• Text Lang: en
• Article Type: journal article
• Data Source:
  • IRDB
  • Crossref
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN