Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game

• Shinohara, Ryusuke

Abstract

The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com.

We examine the coalition-proof equilibria of a participation game in the provision of a (pure) public good. We study which Nash equilibria are achieved through cooperation, and we investigate coalition-proof equilibria under strict and weak domination. We show that under some incentive condition, (i) a profile of strategies is a coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium that is not strictly Pareto-dominated by any other Nash equilibrium and (ii) every strict Nash equilibrium for non-participants is a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination.

Article

International Journal of Game Theory. 39(4):603-615 (2010)

Journal

• International Journal of Game Theory

  International Journal of Game Theory 39 (4), 603-615, 2010-10

  Springer-Verlag

Keywords

• Participation game
• Coalition-proof equilibrium
• Dominance relation

Details

• CRID: 1050001338914043520
• NII Article ID: 120007111054
• NII Book ID: AA00228660
• ISSN: 00207276
• ISSN: 14321270
• DOI: 10.1007/s00182-010-0244-8
• HANDLE: 10091/10788
• Web Site: https://soar-ir.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/2627
• Web Site: http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00182-010-0244-8.pdf
• Web Site: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00182-010-0244-8/fulltext.html
• Web Site: http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00182-010-0244-8
• Text Lang: en
• Article Type: journal article
• Data Source:
  • IRDB
  • Crossref
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN