耐震強度偽装問題の経済分析

DOI Web Site 被引用文献1件 参考文献1件

書誌事項

タイトル別名
  • The Economics of the Quake-Data Falsification Scandal
  • 耐震強度偽造問題の経済分析
  • タイシン キョウド ギゾウ モンダイ ノ ケイザイ ブンセキ

この論文をさがす

抄録

We examined what kind of system is necessary to solve the problems caused by asymmetric information between consumers and builders of condominiums. Under the hidden information that the house builders and designers take an action unobserved by the consumers, they have an incentive to produce the buildings of lower quality such as less performance on earthquake-proof.<BR>We propose to introduce the building quality registration system which provides for important information about whether the authorized inspectors for buildings have checked the involved building and about the flexible premium applied by the insurance company.The higher premium implies the higher risk of falsification about the quake-data and the builder's hidden action of making the less quality products.<BR>The registration system enables consumers to know the quality of the involved building. The flexible premium rate of insurance can protect more efficiently the consumers from flaws of the buildings than the fixed premium that causes a serious moral hazard.

収録刊行物

被引用文献 (1)*注記

もっと見る

参考文献 (1)*注記

もっと見る

関連プロジェクト

もっと見る

キーワード

詳細情報 詳細情報について

問題の指摘

ページトップへ