Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the US-European Alliance

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Bibliographic Information

Other Title
  • 米欧同盟と核兵器拡散問題
  • 米欧同盟と核兵器拡散問題--ケネディ政権の対西独政策
  • ベイオウドウメイ ト カクヘイキ カクサン モンダイ ケネディ セイケン ノ タイ セイドク セイサク
  • ケネディ政権の対西独政策

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Abstract

This paper examines the policy of nuclear non-proliferation by the administration of John F. Kennedy. His record as president about changing the US policy on this issue is not clear-cut. Kennedy tried to reduce reliance upon nuclear weapons to defend the West and did sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the first nuclear arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. At the same time, recent studies of his predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, raise doubts as to whether these policies actually meant that US policy had changed. To understand more fully Kennedy's non-proliferation policy, this paper focuses on his administration's concerns that the Federal Republic of Germany might obtain its own nuclear forces.<br>Independent nuclear weapons in Bonn's hands were problematic because it would seriously complicate “double containment”, a fundamental factor of the US alliance in Europe. West German contribution to contain the Soviet expansion was indispensable, but a too powerful FRG raised anxieties about a possible war caused by the Germans. The policy of “double containment” was designed to make a strong FRG bearable for the Western partners by integrating it into a wider framework. But West German nuclearization could break this compromise, and could shake the US control over West Europeans, if not destroy it, so the Kennedy administration tried to block Bonn from obtaining nuclear weapons.<br>President Kennedy inherited two methods to prevent nuclear proliferation to the European allies: nuclear sharing and international agreements of non-proliferation. Kennedy was believed to be less supportive of nuclear sharing than his predecessor, but he was far from abandoning this option. Actually, the Kennedy administration continued to station a large number of tactical weapons in Western Europe. Its policy of sharing strategic nuclear weapons, especially the Multilateral Force, was more ambivalent. It was less intentional than a result of confused policy by the administration.<br>Kennedy also failed to pursue a non-proliferation agreement through international negotiations. One important cause was Washington's failure to compromise this policy with US-FRG relations. Even though Washington and Moscow shared interest in preventing Bonn's nuclear acquisition, they failed to reach an agreement. Moscow did not hesitate to make the FRG a target of the agreement, but Washington could not sign it in order to sustain the alliance in Europe. The US tried to prevent proliferation in order to preserve the policy of “double containment”. But an agreement targeting the FRG could weaken Bonn's trust with the US and shake the alliance itself. Thus, Kennedy's inability to reach an agreement with the Soviets was inevitable, caused by the original motivation of Washington.

Journal

  • International Relations

    International Relations 2011 (163), 163_55-67, 2011

    JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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