Note on Complete Proof of Axelrod^|^apos;s Theorem

• SHIMIZU Takashi

  Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo

• TAKAHASHI Nobuo

  Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo

書誌事項

タイトル別名

• Note on Complete Proof of Axelrod's Theorem

抄録

This note will give a complete proof of Axelrod's theorem that characterizes the advantage of Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Despite of its importance in Axelrod's study, the proof of the theorem is incomplete. First, the fault of the proof is depicted and two approaches for complementation are shown. Then, we provide the complete proof using these two approaches.

収録刊行物

• Annals of Business Administrative Science

  Annals of Business Administrative Science 2 (4), 39-46, 2003

  特定非営利活動法人 グローバルビジネスリサーチセンター

キーワード

• repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Tit-For-Tat
• cooperation

詳細情報

• CRID: 1390282680398332800
• NII論文ID: 130003379107
• DOI: 10.7880/abas.2.39
• ISSN: 13474456
• ISSN: 13474464
• Web Site: https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/abas/2/4/2_39/_pdf
• 本文言語コード: en
• データソース種別:
  • JaLC
  • Crossref
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN
• 抄録ライセンスフラグ: 使用不可