日豪牛肉紛争 (一九七四-一九七七)

• 後藤 健生

  鹿島平和研究所

書誌事項

タイトル別名

• Japan Australia Beef Trade Dispute, 1974-1977
• The historical Evolution of Australia-Japan Relations
• 日豪関係の史的展開

抄録

Although trade relations between Japan and Australia have been called “mutually dependent, ” there has been some friction since the so-called oil-shock of 1973. Trade relations can work well only when both the production and the demand of the two countries concerned are balanced. The fall in Japanese consumption is the reason for trade frictions in the 1970s. The beef trade problem is one of these cases.<br>The Australian beef industry developed in the 1960s and half of her production was exported. Japan was the second largest market for them after the United States. In early 1974, as beef consumption, which had increased about eight per cent annually untill 1972, decreased 4.2 per cent in 1973, the Japanese government decided not to import any more until beef prices had recovered. This is the “first beef dispute”, in which the Australian Labour government did not try to retaliate against the Japanese cutback. After the Japanese resumption of imports in 1975, Australia complained about the piecemeal announcement of the import quota.The Japanese government promised that the announcement would be made twice a year, but it announced only a part of the quota in the fall of 1975. The Australian conservative government warned that the Japanese decision might damage trade relations between the two countries and suggested that as a retaliation it would not extend the Fisheries Agreement. This is the “second beef dispute.”<br>In Japan, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry attempted to minimize beef imports in order to protect the cattle growers' interests and the beef import policies which were formed under the influence of the farmers' organizations and the LDP leaders who supported them. The most influencial factor to increase the import quota was the pressure from the United States. Briefly speaking, relations with Australia have not been considered in the Japanese policy-making process. On the other hand, the Australian policies were influenced by their own internal politics. The attitude of the Fraser government in the “second dispute” was tougher than that of the Whitlam government because the Liberal-Country coalition relied on the rural electorate. For instance, Mr. Fraser strongly criticised Japan in the fall of 1977 concerning such a minor problem as the long-term announcement of import quotas as his electoral strategy.<br>The government of both countries must play a more constructive role in trade relations as disputes concerning some commodities can be harmful to the general relations between Japan and Australia.

収録刊行物

• 国際政治

  国際政治 1981 (68), 128-145,L7, 1981-08-30

  一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

詳細情報

• CRID: 1390001205334004224
• NII論文ID: 130004302422
• DOI: 10.11375/kokusaiseiji1957.68_128
• ISSN: 18839916
• ISSN: 04542215
• データソース種別:
  • JaLC
  • CiNii Articles
• 抄録ライセンスフラグ: 使用不可