第二次幣原外交初期の日中交渉-一九二九年中ソ紛争の影響を中心として-

• 種稲 秀司

  國學院大學

書誌事項

タイトル別名

• The Sino-Japanese Negotiations in the Second Term of Shidehara Diplomatic First Stage: Focusing on the Effect of The 1929 Sino-Soviet Conflict
• The frontier of International Relations 5
• 国際政治研究の先端5

抄録

Foreign Minister Shidehara kijuro intended to lead the nations of the world in diplomacy oriented towards China. Around the time of his second term as foreign minister, the US had responded to the customs treaty revisions of the Nanjing government and the world's nations had kept apace, but Japan was lagging behind and was deadlocked in relation to China. In order to resolve the situation, Japan aimed at taking the lead in resolving the negotiations that had run into difficulties between China and the other nations regarding the revocation of extraterritorial rights, and indicated their favorability on the issue to Nanjing.<br>Under those circumstances, Shidehara regarded the Sino-Soviet conflict as a violation of the Sino-Soviet pact and advocated the Soviet position of status quo ante, as the Chinese had instigated that conflict leading to the compulsory restoration of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Nanjing, however, sought the understanding of Japan regarding the restoration of the Chinese Eastern Railway, while also unsuccessfully requesting the mediation of Germany and the League of Nations. Consequently, the only effective means left to China for settling the Sino-Soviet conflict was through Japanese arbitration, but the Nanjing government was adamant about the return of the Chinese Eastern Railway and was halfhearted in this matter. Shidehara, seeing in mid-October that the Soviets had expressed a willingness to negotiate directly with the Northeastern government which had softened its stance, sounded out a solution based on direct negotiations between the Soviets and the Northeastern government, but the Nanjing government was not responsive. The government at Nanjing realized the necessity of arbitration after the Soviet army attacked in force in mid-November. However, by this time the US was demonstrating through the extraterritoriality issue a more favorable stance towards China than Japan was, and Nanjing was pinning their hopes on that. Nanjing in the end accepted the status quo ante solution worked out in negotiations between the USSR and the Northeastern government because of the expanding Soviet military threat, armed attack, and US support of Chinese Eastern Railway status quo ante. That thirtyeight nations joined the US-led statement calling for a non-belligerency pact speaks of the inability of Shidehara, who had aimed at conflict resolution led by Japan, to shape opinions among the nations. Japan was not able to recover its leading role in Chinese-oriented diplomacy because of the expansion of US influence, and Japanese diplomacy towards China continued in that state.

収録刊行物

• 国際政治

  国際政治 2008 (152), 98-114,L13, 2008-03-15

  一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

詳細情報

• CRID: 1390001205333930752
• NII論文ID: 130004303527
• DOI: 10.11375/kokusaiseiji1957.152_98
• ISSN: 18839916
• ISSN: 04542215
• データソース種別:
  • JaLC
  • CiNii Articles
• 抄録ライセンスフラグ: 使用不可