PAY-OFF EXTERNALITY AND PERFORMANCE-BASED MAINTENANCE CONTRACTS

• SHI Lei

  大連理工大学　管理学院技術経済研究所

• ONISHI Masamitsu

  京都大学大学院　工学研究科都市社会工学専攻

• KOBAYASHI Kiyoshi

  京都大学経営管理大学院　経営管理講座

Bibliographic Information

Other Title

• ペイオフ外部性と性能規定型維持管理契約

Abstract

This paper examines the adverse selection and moral hazard issues in the performance-based contracts for infrastructure maintenance, which are caused by the pay-off externality between the contracts in the different points in time and by the private monitoring made by the agents. The adverse selection and moral hazard can not be deterred by the penalty systems and competitive tendering, if the maintenance works are carried out by a sequence of the separated short-term contracts. On the other hand, the adverse selection and moral hazard can be efficiently deterred by the long-term contracts with a single agent internalizing the pay-off externality, as far as the agent is forbidden to quit from the contract throughout the contract periods. However, the efficiency of the long-term contracts is flawed if the breach of the contract can be made by the agent. The paper also investigates the means to deter the strategic breach by the agent.

Journal

• Doboku Gakkai Ronbunshuu D

  Doboku Gakkai Ronbunshuu D 63 (3), 344-359, 2007

  Japan Society of Civil Engineers

Keywords

• moral hazard
• performance-based contract
• adverse selection
• contract efficiency

Details

• CRID: 1390001205255424512
• NII Article ID: 130004467285
• DOI: 10.2208/jscejd.63.344
• ISSN: 18806058
• Text Lang: ja
• Data Source:
  • JaLC
  • Crossref
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN
• Abstract License Flag: Disallowed