VCG-equivalent in Expectation Mechanism

• FUJITA Etsushi

  Graduate School of ISEE, Kyushu University

• IWASAKI Atsushi

  Graduate School of Information Systems, University of Electro-Communications

• TODO Taiki

  Graduate School of ISEE, Kyushu University

• YOKOO Makoto

  Graduate School of ISEE, Kyushu University

Bibliographic Information

Other Title

• VCG-equivalent in Expectationメカニズム

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a new class of iterative mechanisms called a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism. To guarantee that sincere strategies are an ex post equilibrium, it inevitably asks an irrelevant query, in which a participant has no incentive to answer the query sincerely. Such an irrelevant query causes unnecessary leakage of private information and a different incentive issue. In a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism, the mechanism achieves the same allocation as VCG, but the transfers are the same as VCG only in expectation. We show that in a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism, sincere strategies constitute a sequential equilibrium. Also, we develop a general procedure for constructing a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism that does not ask any irrelevant query. To demonstrate the applicability of this idea in a practical application, we develop a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism that can be applied to the Japanese 4G spectrum auction.

Journal

• Computer Software

  Computer Software 31 (3), 3_156-3_167, 2014

  Japan Society for Software Science and Technology

Details

• CRID: 1390001204738487296
• NII Article ID: 130004688275
• DOI: 10.11309/jssst.31.3_156
• ISSN: 02896540
• Text Lang: ja
• Data Source:
  • JaLC
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN
• Abstract License Flag: Disallowed