VCG-equivalent in Expectationメカニズム  [in Japanese] VCG-equivalent in Expectation Mechanism  [in Japanese]

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Abstract

本論文では,新しい公開型オークションメカニズムのクラスとして,VCG-equivalent in expectationメカニズムを提案する.正直な戦略の組が事後ナッシュ均衡となる公開型オークションメカニズムはクエリの回答が回答者の財の割当と支払額に影響を与えない無関係なクエリを送信する必要がある.露呈される情報に関して参加者が弱い誘因を持つ場合,無関係なクエリを送信するメカニズムは望ましくない.本論文で新しく提案するVCG-equivalent in expectationメカニズムは,割当はVickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)メカニズムと等しく,支払額はVCGの支払額の期待値とするメカニズムである.本論文では,VCG-equivalent in expectationメカニズムにおいて,正直な戦略の組が逐次的均衡となること,及び,無関係なクエリを送信しないVCG-equivalent in expectationメカニズムを構築する手法を示した.さらに,提案メカニズムの現実的な応用事例への適用可能性を示すため,日本の第四世代の周波数オークションに適用可能なメカニズムを示した.

In this paper, we develop a new class of iterative mechanisms called a <I>VCG-equivalent in expectation</I> mechanism. To guarantee that sincere strategies are an <I>ex post</I> equilibrium, it inevitably asks an irrelevant query, in which a participant has no incentive to answer the query sincerely. Such an irrelevant query causes unnecessary leakage of private information and a different incentive issue. In a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism, the mechanism achieves the same allocation as VCG, but the transfers are the same as VCG only in expectation. We show that in a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism, sincere strategies constitute a sequential equilibrium. Also, we develop a general procedure for constructing a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism that does not ask any irrelevant query. To demonstrate the applicability of this idea in a practical application, we develop a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism that can be applied to the Japanese 4G spectrum auction.

Journal

  • Computer Software

    Computer Software 31(3), 3_156-3_167, 2014

    Japan Society for Software Science and Technology

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