Round Addition DFA on SPN Block Ciphers

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Abstract

A method of round addition attack on substitution-permutation network (SPN) block ciphers using differential fault analysis (DFA) is presented. For the 128-bit advanced encryption standard (AES), we show that secret keys can be extracted using one correct ciphertext and two faulty ciphertexts. Furthermore, we evaluate the success rate of a round addition DFA attack, experimentally. The proposed method can also be applied to lightweight SPN block cipher such as KLEIN and LED.

Journal

  • IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences

    IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences E97.A(12), 2671-2674, 2014

    The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers

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