A Collision Attack on a Double-Block-Length Compression Function Instantiated with 8-/9-Round AES-256

  • CHEN Jiageng
    Computer School, Central China Normal University
  • HIROSE Shoichi
    Graduate School of Engineering, University of Fukui
  • KUWAKADO Hidenori
    Faculty of Informatics, Kansai University
  • MIYAJI Atsuko
    Graduate School of Engineering, Osaka University School of Information Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology CREST, JST

抄録

This paper presents the first non-trivial collision attack on the double-block-length compression function presented at FSE 2006 instantiated with round-reduced AES-256: f0(h0||h1,M)||f1(h0||h1,M) such that   f0(h0||h1, M) = Eh<sub>1||M</sub>(h0)⊕h0 ,   f1(h0||h1,M) = Eh<sub>1||M</sub>(h0c)⊕h0c ,   where || represents concatenation, E is AES-256 and c is a 16-byte non-zero constant. The proposed attack is a free-start collision attack using the rebound attack proposed by Mendel et al. The success of the proposed attack largely depends on the configuration of the constant c: the number of its non-zero bytes and their positions. For the instantiation with AES-256 reduced from 14 rounds to 8 rounds, it is effective if the constant c has at most four non-zero bytes at some specific positions, and the time complexity is 264 or 296. For the instantiation with AES-256 reduced to 9 rounds, it is effective if the constant c has four non-zero bytes at some specific positions, and the time complexity is 2120. The space complexity is negligible in both cases.

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