TWO-SIDED MATCHING WITH EXTERNALITIES: A SURVEY

• Bando Keisuke

  Tokyo Institute of Technology

• Kawasaki Ryo

  Tokyo Institute of Technology

• Muto Shigeo

  Tokyo Institute of Technology

抄録

The literature on two-sided matching markets with externalities has grown over the past several years, as it is now one of the primary topics of research in two-sided matching theory. A matching market with externalities is different from the classical matching market in that agents not only care about who they are matched with, but also care about whom other agents are matched to. In this survey, we start with two-sided matching markets with externalities for the one-to-one case and then focus on the many-to-one case. For many-to-one matching problems, these externalities often are present in two ways. First, the agents on the “many” side may care about who their colleagues are, that is, who else is matched to the same “one.” Second, the “one” side may care about how the others are matched.

収録刊行物

• 日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会論文誌

  日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会論文誌 59 (1), 35-71, 2016

  公益社団法人 日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会

キーワード

• Game theory
• two-sided matching
• externalities
• colleagues

詳細情報

• CRID: 1390282679085833728
• NII論文ID: 130005124576
• NII書誌ID: AA00703935
• DOI: 10.15807/jorsj.59.35
• ISSN: 21888299
• ISSN: 04534514
• NDL書誌ID: 027080220
• Web Site: http://id.ndl.go.jp/bib/027080220
• Web Site: https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp/books/R000000004-I027080220
• Web Site: https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jorsj/59/1/59_35/_pdf
• 本文言語コード: en
• データソース種別:
  • JaLC
  • NDL
  • Crossref
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN
• 抄録ライセンスフラグ: 使用不可