ATTRITION GAME MODELS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ON A NETWORK

• Hohzaki Ryusuke

  National Defense Academy

• Sunaga Keiich

  Japan Ministry of Defense

抄録

This paper deals with two-person zero-sum (TPZS) games in which two players conflict on a network through an attrition phenomenon. The problem has a variety of applications, but we model the problem as a TPZS game with some attrition between attackers and defenders. The attackers start from a starting node and reach a destination node, expecting to keep their initial members intact. The defenders deploy their forces on arcs to intercept the attackers. If the attackers encounter defenders deployed on an arc, the attackers incur casualties proportional to the number of the deployed defenders. We discuss four games where the attackers or the defenders obtain information of their opponent. The games are two-stage games with a common payoff of the number of surviving attackers. We formulate them into linear programming problems to derive their equilibrium points and evaluate the value of the information acquisitioned in the games.

収録刊行物

• 日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会論文誌

  日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会論文誌 59 (2), 195-217, 2016

  公益社団法人 日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会

キーワード

• Game theory
• linear programming
• attrition
• network interdiction

詳細情報

• CRID: 1390282679086403584
• NII論文ID: 130005146564
• NII書誌ID: AA00703935
• DOI: 10.15807/jorsj.59.195
• ISSN: 21888299
• ISSN: 04534514
• NDL書誌ID: 027286629
• Web Site: https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp/books/R000000004-I027286629
• Web Site: https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jorsj/59/2/59_195/_pdf
• 本文言語コード: en
• データソース種別:
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