<b>ライプニッツの様相</b><b>論</b>

書誌事項

タイトル別名
  • Leibniz on Modalities in contrast to the necessity of finite modes in Spinoza
  • ライプニッツの様相論 : スピノザの「有限様態の必然性」に対して
  • ライプニッツ ノ ヨウソウロン : スピノザ ノ 「 ユウゲン ヨウタイ ノ ヒツゼンセイ 」 ニ タイシテ
  • <b>――スピノザの「有限様態の必然性」に対し</b><b>て </b>

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抄録

While Spinoza, rejecting the project of “theodicy”, insists on “absolute necessity”of the world from the view point of eternity, Leibniz, as the originator of the concept of “possible worlds,” advocates the optimism, namely the logical contingency and moral necessity of the best of this world. Given this seemingly fatal opposition of two 17th century major metaphysicians about modalities, it is philosophically important to see the causes of this tension and, thereby to have some prospect for better understanding of the problems of modalities.<br>Firstly, from the representation of recent interpretations of “the necessity of finite modes” in Spinozaʼs Ethica, especially from Huenemannʼs about “the instantiation of geometrical essence” in the finite modes; secondly from contextual understandings of Leibnizʼs comments about texts such as IP29 of Ethica; and thirdly,characterizing the distinction between modal inferences of consequentiae and consequentis in Leibniz, I maintain that the ontologically irreducible status of agency of actions and the proper concepts of logical contingency turn out to be decisive in the controversy on modalities. Finally, it is argued that the modal sentences as such are seen by Leibniz as a type of reflexive proposition the truth values of which cannot be unconditionally decided.

収録刊行物

  • 哲学

    哲学 2014 (65), 73-89_L7, 2014

    日本哲学会

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