<b>時間は様相に先立つか </b> Does Time precede Modality?

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抄録

The titular question can be interpreted as follows: Does future possibility precede logical possibility ─ which provides simultaneous alternatives? In this paper, I defend a philosophical intuition that future possibility is more fundamental than logical possibility, even though the former seems conceptually more complex than the latter. My attempt can be regarded as retreating from Duns Scotusʼs modal semantics to Aristotleʼs (cf. Yagi 2009, Knuuttila 2013). Moreover, I attempt to reconstruct my previous arguments (Aoyama 2008, 2011) on the assumption that the above intuition is correct, and seek to connect Kripkeʼs famous argument about <i>de re</i> modality (Kripke 1980) with Wittgensteinʼs argument on certainty regarding <i>de re </i>beliefs (Wittgenstein 1969). In the appendix, I note that the background of this paper is related to Nietzscheʼs peculiar fatalism (I call a world in which this kind of fatalism is true not an ʻunfree worldʼ but an ʻ<i>a</i>free worldʼ; everything in such a world involves no contrast between being free and being unfree that can be found in the determiningdetermined relation).

収録刊行物

  • 哲学

    哲学 2014(65), 9-24_L3, 2014

    日本哲学会

各種コード

  • NII論文ID(NAID)
    130005161734
  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    AN00150419
  • 本文言語コード
    JPN
  • ISSN
    0387-3358
  • NDL 記事登録ID
    025947488
  • NDL 請求記号
    Z9-202
  • データ提供元
    NDL  J-STAGE 
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