Greenhouse-gas Emission Controls and International Carbon Leakage through Trade Liberalization
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- Ishikawa Jota
- Hitotsubashi University and RIETI
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- Okubo Toshihiro
- Keio University
Abstract
Using the footloose capital model with two countries, this paper studies different impacts of emission taxes and quotas on firm location and global emissions under trade liberalization. If only one country (North) sets a target of emissions, firms may have incentive to relocate to the other country (South). That is, the pollution haven effect could arise. We show that a further decrease in trade costs, given an emission regulation in North, increases firm relocation and global emissions only if trade costs are relatively low. Moreover, compared with emission taxes, emission quotas moderate firm relocation, which results in less pollution haven and hence less global emissions. <br>JEL:F18, Q54
Journal
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- The International Economy
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The International Economy 19 (0), 1-22, 2016
The Japan Society of International Economics
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390282680388266880
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- NII Article ID
- 130005549214
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- ISSN
- 18844367
- 21866074
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- Text Lang
- en
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
- Crossref
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed