On making a false judgment of taste

• TAKAGI Shun

Bibliographic Information

Other Title

• 趣味判断が誤るとき
• 『判断力批判』における情感的意識の観点から
• From the perspective of aesthetic

Abstract

In the First Book of the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), judgments of taste which state the beauty are based on a subjctive ground, or the feeling of pleasure, so that they are not logical cognitive judgments which constitute “a cognition of the object through concepts of it” (V 211) but aesthetic judgments. Therefore, they cannot state truth or falsehood of themselves as logical cognitive judgments do. However, Kant uses the expression of “a false (or an erroneous) judgment of taste (ein irriges Geschmacksurteil)” (V 216). If this “false (or erroneous)” is not logical one, what does it mean? About what are judgments of taste false? Now, we have three leading interpretations of judgments of taste to resolve these questions, i.e. interpretation from an epistemological, moral, aesthetic point of view. But I think that the first two interpretations are not successful, because they contradict Kant’s statements in some points as I will show. Thus, in this paper by adopting the aesthetic interpretation of judgments of taste I shall answer the questions concerned, namely argue that the falsehood (or error) of them consists in choosing an inappropriate feeling of pleasure for the ground of judgments of taste.

Journal

• Aesthetics

  Aesthetics 68 (1), 13-, 2017

  The Japanese Society for Aesthetics

Details

• CRID: 1390282763017549440
• NII Article ID: 130007387461
• DOI: 10.20631/bigaku.68.1_13
• ISSN: 24241164
• ISSN: 05200962
• Text Lang: ja
• Data Source:
  • JaLC
  • CiNii Articles
• Abstract License Flag: Disallowed