Improved Integral Attack on HIGHT
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- FUNABIKI Yuki
- Kobe University
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- TODO Yosuke
- NTT Secure Platform Laboratories
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- ISOBE Takanori
- University of Hyogo
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- MORII Masakatu
- Kobe University
Abstract
<p>HIGHT is a 64-bit block lightweight cipher, which adopts the ARX-based generalized Feistel network, and it accepts a 128-bit key. It is a standard encryption algorithm in South Korea and also is internationally standardized by ISO/IEC 18033-3. Therefore, many third-party cryptanalyses have been proposed against HIGHT. Impossible differential and integral attacks are applied to reduced-round HIGHT, and especially, the impossible differential attack causes the 27-round attack, which is the current best attack under the single-key setting. In this paper, we propose some improved integral attacks against HIGHT. We first apply the division property to HIGHT and find new 19-round integral characteristics, which are improved by two rounds compared with the previous best ones. We append 9-round key recovery to these characteristics and it enables us to attack 28-round HIGHT. Its time complexity is 2127.02 where 263 chosen plaintexts and 2117 memory are required. Moreover, we can attack 29-round HIGHT if the full codebook is used, where its time and memory complexities are 2126.07 and 2118, respectively. It improves by two rounds compared with the previous best attack.</p>
Journal
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- IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
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IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences E102.A (9), 1259-1271, 2019-09-01
The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390845702274786816
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- NII Article ID
- 130007699509
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- ISSN
- 17451337
- 09168508
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- Text Lang
- en
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
- Crossref
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed