A Trial Study of Official Development Assistance as Inter-National Negotiations: Fundamental Findings by Simple Strategic Analysis

DOI Web Site

Bibliographic Information

Other Title
  • 国家間交渉としての開発援助に関する研究への試行：戦略的分析による基礎的考察
  • コッカ カン コウショウ ト シテ ノ カイハツ エンジョ ニ カンスル ケンキュウ エ ノ シコウ : センリャクテキ ブンセキ ニ ヨル キソテキ コウサツ

Search this article

Abstract

<p>Both donors and recipients must negotiate before they agree upon foreign aid contracts. As a first step to study ODA (Official Development Assistance) negotiations, we start to assume a sole motive of aid to be selfish especially for donors. Although it might be unusual to treat both donors and recipients as equal negotiators in foreign aid literature, it is quite natural in economics in general. In this paper, donors send foreign aid resources to recipients while the latter transfers something back to the former in return for the aid. Even in a simple setting (one donor, one recipient and one good), we confirmed a fundamental but interesting reality: Foreign aid occurs only when the wealth difference between a donor and a recipient is high. Also, depending on the negotiations, their welfare levels and income inequality vary: Both a donor and a recipient become better-off when the income inequality declines as a result of foreign aid. However, one (a donor or a recipient) becomes better-off (the other remains the same) when the income inequality rises. We considered multiple donors and recipients in order to analyze the effects of competition and collusion. We discussed the UN as a typical place of aid negotiations among multiple donors and recipients, and found that aid contracts can be affected by the majority rule in the UN. Lastly, we analyzed an extended case where each vote in the UN values differently to each member country.</p>

Journal

Related Projects

See more

Details 詳細情報について

Report a problem

Back to top