RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DELAY AND CONTRACT SCHEME FOR CONSTRUCTION PROJECT

• YOSHIZUMI Hisashi

  Graduate School of Management, Kyoto University

• SEGI Shunsuke

  京都大学工学研究科都市社会工学専攻 助教

• KOBAYASHI Kiyoshi

  京都大学経営管理大学院 特任教授

Bibliographic Information

Other Title

• 建設プロジェクトにおける契約形態と遅延について

Abstract

This paper sheds light on relationship between contract scheme for construction project and a nature of delay. In a one-to-one contract, generally, if a delay is attributed to the single contractor, the contractor should pay “Liquidate Damages (LD)” in accordance with contract. Therefore, the contractor has strong incentive to avoid the LD payment. However, this conclusion cannot be applied to the cases with multiple agents. This paper analyzes how each contractor can be motivated to avoid delay in multiple agents situation by use of principal-agents relationships. In the meantime, a consortium type of project allocates LD to each contractor based on the shared responsibility for delay. In reality, however, it is hard for the concerned agents to agree upon shared responsibility each other in advance. In other words, there may arise very difficult disputes around how much each contractor has to compensate LD in every circumstance of delay. This paper also investigates the mechanism on how each agents in a consortium project is less motivated to meet the deadline than agent in a one-to-one contract.

Journal

• Global Business Journal

  Global Business Journal 6 (1), 1-8, 2020

  Seciety of Global Business

Keywords

• project management, delay, contract scheme, consortium, incentive

Details

• CRID: 1390003825190627456
• NII Article ID: 130007858955
• DOI: 10.32169/gbj.6.1_1
• ISSN: 24340111
• Text Lang: ja
• Data Source:
  • JaLC
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN
• Abstract License Flag: Disallowed