<i>Shingikai</i> (Advisory Councils in Japan) as Instruments of Political Control

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  • Ikeda Shun
    Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University Japan Society for the Promotion of Science

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Other Title
  • 官僚制への統制手段としての審議会
  • ―政権党による 「手続的指示」 の数理的・定量的分析

Abstract

<p>In a representative democracy, how do politicians control unelected bureaucrats? This research argues that they use Shingikai (advisory councils in Japan) as instruments of political control by compelling bureaucrats to consult with it.</p><p>  Although Shingikai is an administrative organization established for democratization, a criticism that it only confirms a bureaucrats’ policy so never contributes to democratization is deeply rooted. In contrast, this research demonstrates that politicians intend to control bureaucrats by making a law which compels bureaucrats to consult with Shingikai (we call such laws “procedural instructions”).</p><p>  Then, under what conditions do politicians make procedural instructions? This research sets up hypotheses with a game theoretic approach and tests them with a quantitative analysis using an original dataset of all Shingikai in 2002.</p><p>  As a result, we find that politicians tend to make more procedural instructions when (1) politicians’ ideal points of policy are more different from those of bureaucrats, (2) Shingikai is less authoritative, (3) politicians’ ideal points of policy are closer to those of Shingikai, and (4) politicians are more dissatisfied with a status quo. This result implies that bureaucrats are strategically compelled to consult with Shingikai by politicians so Shingikai can be used as instruments of political control.</p>

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