A Dynamic Budget-balanced Integration Mechanism for LQG Power Networks with Individual Preferences

• MURAO Toshiyuki

  College of Engineering, Kanazawa Institute of Technology

• SUZUKI Yukinori

  Graduate Program in Mechanical Engineering, Kanazawa Institute of Technology

• HIRATA Kenji

  Faculty of Engineering, University of Toyama

• UCHIDA Kenko

  Research Institute for Science and Engineering, Waseda University

Bibliographic Information

Other Title

• 選好を考慮したLQG電力需給ネットワークに対する動的予算均衡統合メカニズムの設計
• セン コウ オ コウリョ シタ LQG デンリョク ジュキュウ ネットワーク ニ タイスル ドウテキ ヨサン キンコウ トウゴウ メカニズム ノ セッケイ

Abstract

This paper presents dynamic budget-balanced integration mechanisms for LQG power networks based on mechanism design theory in economics. The LQG power network model, which is motivated by an average system frequency model, consists of generators and consumers, called agents, and one public commission, called the utility. Each agent, who has a type with his preference, exercises private control to minimize the costs according to a personal cost functional, while the utility decides prices to minimize the costs according to a public cost functional and manages information transmission. In this problem setting, we propose dynamic budget-balanced integration mechanisms that integrate the strategic determination of private controls by rational agents into the optimal public controls with real-time pricing and monetary transfer costs. Two dynamic integration mechanisms, which together achieve all of social welfare maximization, Bayesian incentive compatibility, and budget balance, are proposed based on the cost functional and the Hamiltonian. The effectiveness of the proposed mechanisms are assessed through simulations.

Journal

• Transactions of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers

  Transactions of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers 57 (8), 358-366, 2021

  The Society of Instrument and Control Engineers

Keywords

• game theory
• mechanism design
• real-time pricing
• networked control
• budget balance

Details

• CRID: 1390289099788271360
• NII Article ID: 130008076437
• NII Book ID: AN00072392
• DOI: 10.9746/sicetr.57.358
• ISSN: 18838189
• ISSN: 04534654
• NDL BIB ID: 031678528
• Web Site: https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp/books/R000000004-I031678528
• Web Site: https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/sicetr/57/8/57_358/_pdf
• Text Lang: ja
• Data Source:
  • JaLC
  • NDL
  • Crossref
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN
• Abstract License Flag: Disallowed