Sensor Scheduling-Based Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in Power System State Estimation

• OBATA Sho

  Graduate School of Information Science and Technology, Hokkaido University

• KOBAYASHI Koichi

  Graduate School of Information Science and Technology, Hokkaido University

• YAMASHITA Yuh

  Graduate School of Information Science and Technology, Hokkaido University

Abstract

In the state estimation of steady-state power networks, a cyber attack that cannot be detected from the residual (i.e., the estimation error) is called a false data injection (FDI) attack. In this letter, to enforce the security of power networks, we propose a method of detecting an FDI attack. In the proposed method, an FDI attack is detected by randomly choosing sensors used in the state estimation. The effectiveness of the proposed method is presented by two examples including the IEEE 14-bus system.

Journal

• IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences

  IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences E105.A (6), 1015-1019, 2022-06-01

  The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers

Keywords

• power networks
• state estimation
• false data injection (FDI) attacks
• random sensor scheduling

Details

• CRID: 1390573726315210624
• NII Article ID: 130008128614
• DOI: 10.1587/transfun.2021eal2098
• ISSN: 17451337
• ISSN: 09168508
• HANDLE: 2115/90183
• Web Site: https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/transfun/E105.A/6/E105.A_2021EAL2098/_pdf
• Text Lang: en
• Data Source:
  • JaLC
  • IRDB
  • Crossref
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN
• Abstract License Flag: Disallowed