On Equilibrium Analysis in Common-Pool Resource Game with Population Uncertainty

• MIYASHITA Haruki

  Faculty of Economics, Josai University

Bibliographic Information

Other Title

• 対戦人数の不確実な共同利用資源ゲームの均衡分析

Abstract

In this study, we examine the effects of population uncertainty on the equilibrium in common-pool resource game. We create a hypothetical strategic environment where each player was randomly drawn from a pool of potential players. It shows that the equilibrium investment is higher when the number of opponents is a common knowledge than when the number of opponents is uncertain. Moreover, population uncertainty in common-pool resource game might prevent the tragedy of the commons.

Journal

• Japanese Journal of Risk Analysis

  Japanese Journal of Risk Analysis 31 (3), 231-234, 2022-03-25

  The Society for Risk Analysis, Japan

Keywords

• common-pool resource game
• population uncertainty
• the tragedy of the commons

Details

• CRID: 1390854882616708608
• NII Article ID: 130008135815
• DOI: 10.11447/jjra.sra-0379
• ISSN: 24358436
• ISSN: 24358428
• Text Lang: ja
• Data Source:
  • JaLC
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN
• Abstract License Flag: Disallowed