Is a PD game still a dilemma for Japanese rural villagers? A field and laboratory comparison of the impact of social group membership on cooperation

• Yohei Mitani

抄録

Local norms and shared beliefs in cohesive social groups regulate individual behavior in everyday economic life. I use a door-to-door field experiment where a hundred and twenty villagers recruited from twenty-three communities in a Japanese rural mountainous village play a simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma game. To examine whether a set of experiences shared through interactions among community members affect experimental behavior, I compare villagers’ behavior under in-community and out-community random matching protocols. I also report a counterpart laboratory experiment with seventy-two university student subjects to address the external validity of laboratory experiments. The findings are three-fold. First, almost full cooperation is achieved when villagers play a prisoner’s dilemma game with their anonymous community members. Second, cooperation is significantly higher within the in-group compared to the out-group treatment in both the laboratory and field experiments. Third, although a significant treatment effect of social group membership is preserved, a big difference in the average cooperation rates is observed between the laboratory and field.

収録刊行物

• The Japanese Economic Review

  The Japanese Economic Review 73 (1), 103-121, 2021-07-26

  Springer Science and Business Media LLC

キーワード

• Economics and Econometrics

詳細情報

• CRID: 1361978698497818112
• NII論文ID: 210000170081
• DOI: 10.1007/s42973-021-00086-8
• ISSN: 14685876
• ISSN: 13524739
• Web Site: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s42973-021-00086-8.pdf
• Web Site: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42973-021-00086-8/fulltext.html
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