西田哲学における行為的自己とフランス哲学における自我と他者

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  • Nishida's Concept of Active Self and the Problem of Ego and the Other in French Philosophy
  • ニシダ テツガク ニ オケル コウイテキ ジコ ト フランス テツガク ニ オケル ジガ ト タシャ

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It is usual to compare Nishida's philosophy with German idealism, especially Fichte's thought. Is it improper to relate it to French Philosophy? Nishida mentions in the sixth volume of his complete works the stream of the philosophy of sentiment in France that flowed from Pascal's ideas to those of Maine de Biran. He appreciates this philosophical trend because he sees it developing and deepening the self-consciousness discovered by Descartes as cogito in the same direction as he is pursuing it. Nishida considers a type of judgment in which the special is subsumed by the general as the fundamental structure of our experience and rewrites it with elementary logic in the form of a subject and predicate. He then attains the concepts of place and the individual in the subsuming judgment by pushing the specific and the general toward subject and predicate, respectively, to the extreme: The “individual” is the last subject that could never turn into a predicate, and reciprocally, place, named the “concrete universal” at this stage, is the last predicate that could never turn into a subject. The concrete universal is a place where the individuals are put, or exist, and in this case, the whole individuals constitute the natural world. However, what is truly individual could be nothing other than what is truly personal. Can a person take his place in the concrete universal to be situated in the natural world? Descartes' cogito sum has already given a negative answer to this question. Even if the existence of the entire universe is uncertain, I exist absolutely as long as I do not cease thinking. Yet, where am I? Nishida finds the Cartesian ego in the self-conscious universal that extends below the concrete universal and envelops it. The self-conscious universal constitutes a sphere of consciousness where the ego resides in different modes according to the profundity of self-consciousness. However, the self-conscious universal is still no more than a limited and abstract plan of the active universal, so that the Cartesian ego is a shadow of one of the active selves determined by the active universal. That is, a shadow of the intellectual active self that corresponds to consciousness in general in Kant's philosophy. The active self in its intellectual mode remains purely formal and does not yet possess its proper content. Fichte tried to fill this formal self and mistook the transcendent will for an active self. It is Maine de Biran, Nishida thinks, who took the proper direction, going toward, not noema, but noesis, and finding sentiment intime or intérieur as the substance of the active self. Writing of his favorite, Bergson, Nishida claims that this French philosopher's concept of pure duration must be the content of the consciousness in general. While Kant largely formalized the intellectual active self to minimize its content, Bergson maximized its content as pure duration to minimize its formal aspect. In this sense, Bergson followed Maine de Biran. What is the difference between them? In Nishida's view, the individual is active as long as it determines itself by itself, but this self-determination is effective only if the individual determines itself against other individuals. The active self undergoes self-determination by seeing the absolute other in itself and reciprocally by seeing itself in the absolute other. The difference is that in Biranism the absolute other is matter whereas in Bergsonism it is other life. As matter is, from Nishida's perspective, an abstract aspect of personal individual life, the Bergsonian self would have a deeper and richer self-consciousness than the Biranian self. However, in the pure duration of Bergsonism, the self-determination of the active self does not imply self-negation. Nishida thinks that in pure duration, the self passes to itself continuously because there the self-determination does not operate against the absolute other, namely, the other person, or “thou.”

収録刊行物

  • 哲學研究

    哲學研究 574 1-38, 2002-10-10

    京都哲学会 (京都大学文学部内)

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