現代ロシアの歴史教育と第二次世界大戦の記憶

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タイトル別名
  • Memory of World War II and History Education in Putin’s Russia
  • ゲンダイ ロシア ノ レキシ キョウイク ト ダイニジ セカイ タイセン ノ キオク

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Memory of war with Germany is the mainstay of Russia’s political ideology, which draws constant scholarly attention to Russian policy of depiction of WWII. Preceding literature on this issue mainly addresses the following two aspects: (1) the ways in which Russia’s democratization since the 1990s has shaped its narrative of the Soviet era and (2) the extent to which varied interpretations of the events during and after WWII affect Russia’s interactions with the West and former Soviet satellites in the mid-2000s. Examining Russian policy concerning Soviet history under Putin in terms of transitional justice, Kora Andrieu contends that it is the destruction of civil society in the course of the seventy-year communist rule that hinders the recognition and investigation of crimes committed by the Soviet regime; in addition, the Russians find it difficult to see the previous regime with hostility as they would an externally imposed regime. Accordingly, Andrieu concludes that Russia now represents a case of failed transitional justice that “chooses not to confront its violent past.” Observing the revival of interest in the Soviet past that temporarily declined in the 1990s after the ferment of Perestroika, Nikolai Koposov meanwhile examines Russian policy of historical memory from 2009 to 2010 against a backdrop of international conflicts over the interpretation of WWII. These works confirm the intensity of controversy revolving around the narrative of the Stalinist period including WWII in political and ideological terms. However, those interested in Russia’s path of democratization tend to study the disputes over official interpretations of history by taking for granted Putin’s “authoritarian” administration and Russia’s failure in democratizing its society. They disregard the extent to which neighboring EU countries’ politics of history have worked on Russian domestic debates. Meanwhile, those interested in international conflicts over interpretations of WWII in the mid-2000s overlook Russia’s political and social reforms since the 1990s, which have actually shaped current official policies and public opinion. In this article, I analyze the controversies over the meaning of WWII for Russia by comparing a variety of school textbooks, taking into account both domestic political, social, and educational reforms since the 1990s and the international environment in the 2000s. While Russia’s political authorities persistently attempt to control history education in spite of their failure in earlier endeavors, current history textbooks present views of the Stalin era and WWII as being at odds with those of the political authorities; these textbooks inherit the spirit of debate that took shape during Perestroika and in the 1990s, when textbooks provided plural interpretations and encouraged pupils to examine the meanings of historical events. Russian intellectuals are against reviving the Soviet-era uniform textbook, although they are ready to accept the government’s intervention in history education so as to maintain its quality, provided that a multiplicity of opinions is guaranteed. In addition, Russia’s largest publishers are opposing the imposition of a single textbook. Therefore, it is unlikely that the government will determine the content of history textbooks in the near future. Still, it is undeniable that Russia’s political authorities and society share the desire to standardize history textbooks, a tendency that derives from experience of confusion in education in the 1990s. Moreover, Russia as the USSR’s successor state has encountered more difficulty in constructing a national identity than any other ex-Soviet and Socialist country due to its long Socialist era and its profound legacy embedded in society. The government and citizens find it difficult to distinguish themselves from the Soviet authorities as “others” and to identify who were criminals and who were the victims. Furthermore, the plunge in living standards, the ebb of Russia’s international reputation, the enlargement of socioeconomic disparities, and the rise of criminality and unemployment in the 1990s all led the Russian people to fall into an identity crisis with a heightened nostalgia for the Soviet past even before Putin’s elevation to presidency. When these domestic developments are accompanied by international disagreements over the interpretation of WWII, the most significant historical event for Russia, this can stoke up the aspiration for uniform textbooks that will help to enhance national pride in history more forcefully. Thus, disputes over Russia’s teaching of Soviet history and WWII in the future depend on the extent to which politicians and scholars of Russia’s neighboring countries can promote dialog through engaging Russia by scholarly rather than political means.

収録刊行物

  • スラヴ研究

    スラヴ研究 62 29-57, 2015-07-15

    北海道大学スラブ･ユーラシア研究センター

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