-
- Ran Canetti
- IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Hawthorne, New York
-
- Oded Goldreich
- Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel
-
- Shai Halevi
- IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Hawthorne, New York
抄録
<jats:p> We take a critical look at the relationship between the security of cryptographic schemes in the Random Oracle Model, and the security of the schemes that result from implementing the random oracle by so called "cryptographic hash functions".The main result of this article is a negative one: There exist signature and encryption schemes that are secure in the Random Oracle Model, but for which <jats:italic>any implementation</jats:italic> of the random oracle results in insecure schemes. In the process of devising the above schemes, we consider possible definitions for the notion of a "good implementation" of a random oracle, pointing out limitations and challenges. </jats:p>
収録刊行物
-
- Journal of the ACM
-
Journal of the ACM 51 (4), 557-594, 2004-07
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- Tweet
キーワード
詳細情報 詳細情報について
-
- CRID
- 1360855568925279104
-
- NII論文ID
- 80016767828
-
- ISSN
- 1557735X
- 00045411
-
- データソース種別
-
- Crossref
- CiNii Articles